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Heterogeneity Among Patent Plaintiffs:
An Empirical Analysis of Patent Case
Progression, Settlement, and Adjudication
Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, and David L. Schwartz*
This article empirically studies current claims that patent trolls, also known as patent
assertion entities (PAEs) or non-practicing entities (NPEs), behave badly in litigation by
bringing frivolous patent infringement suits and seeking nuisance fee settlements. The
study explores these claims by examining the relationship between the type of patentee-
plaintiffs and litigation outcomes (e.g., settlement, grant of summary judgment, trial, and
procedural dispositions), while taking into account, among other factors, the technology of
the patents being asserted and the identity of the lawyers and judges. The study finds
significant heterogeneity among different patent holder entity types. Individual inventors,
failed operating companies, patent holding companies, and large patent aggregators each
have distinct litigation strategies largely consistent with their economic posture and
incentives. These PAEs appear to litigate differently from each other and from operating
companies. Accordingly, to the extent any patent policy reform targets specific patent
plaintiff types, such reforms should go beyond the practicing entity versus non-practicing
entity distinction and understand how the proposed legislation would impact more
granular and meaningful categories of patent owners.
I. Introduction
There is a popular belief that an “explosion of patent litigation,” driven by a particular
type of patent holder, is the key contributor to a national epidemic that supposedly has
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cost the economy $320 billion within five years.1 Even President Obama announced a
number of actions and asked Congress to enact legislation to combat this patent asser-
tion problem.2 And this increase in patent litigation is driven, the current thinking
goes, by a particular class of patent holder— “patent assertion entities” (PAEs)3 or “non-
practicing entities” (NPEs)4 (also referred to by some as “patent trolls”). Those propos-
ing this legislation point to these PAEs in general as causing the sharp increase in pat-
ent litigation and settling more cases before trial than in the past.5 Because these
entities make no products, they are immune from counterclaims for patent infringe-
ment in a way that operating companies are not.6 The current narrative is that they sue
thousands of defendants,7 from operating companies to individual consumers of alleg-
edly infringing products,8 carefully picking the judicial districts where they bring their
patent lawsuits9 and asserting questionable Internet patents.10 PAEs11 rely heavily on the
1Laurie White & Dale Venturini, Protect Main Street from Patent Trolls, Providence J., Feb. 27, 2014 (http://
www.providencejournal.com/opinion/commentary/20140227-laurie-white-and-dale-venturini-protect-main-street-
from-patent-trolls.ece).
2The White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET---Executive Actions, Answering the President’s Call
to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/
20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p).
3Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent Ecosystem and its Implications for
the Patent System, 62 Hastings L.J. 297 (2010) (coining the term “patent assertion entity”).
4Robin Feldman, Thomas Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Enti-
ties, 11 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 357 (2014).
5Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 375 (2014).
6Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls
Without Harming Innovators? 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1316 (2013) (“Because NPEs do not sell products that could be
the subject of a counterclaim, they do not face this risk when filing suit.”).
7RPX 2015 Report, NPE Litigation, Patent Marketplace, and NPE Cost at 8, Chart 3 (2015) (finding over 4,000
defendants in NPE cases in 2014).
8Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000---For Using Scanners, Ars Technica (Jan. 2, 2013) (“But in the history of patent
trolls, 2012 may go down as the ‘year of the user.’ The [letters described in the article] are a particularly alarming example
of a practice that has become commonplace in the past year or two---going after the users of basic technologies.”).
9The patent lawsuit venue criticism may change after the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in T.C. Heartland
LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, No. 16--341 (decided May 22, 2017) (https://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/16pdf/16-341_8n59.pdf).
10Colleen Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, 77 Md. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018); Brian Love &
James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 Stan-
ford Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2017).
11While we recognize that some people use NPE, PAE, and patent troll interchangeably while others differenti-
ate among the terms, in this article we will use “PAE” to mean all entities that assert patents in litigation with-
out concurrently manufacturing or selling products. We divide PAE into various types, which is explained in
Section III.A.
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asymmetric costs of litigation, which swing heavily in their favor since they have few
documents to produce in discovery.12 PAEs also collect “nuisance fees” from those afraid
of expensive litigation.13 In contrast to this general class of PAEs, companies that assert
patents that are embodied in their own products and/or services, referred to as
“operating companies,” are seen as behaving in an acceptable and more predictable
manner when engaged in patent litigation. To combat this “explosion” of PAE litigation,
in 2016 Congress proposed new litigation and civil procedure rules applicable only to
patent cases, including some directed specifically at those who do not practice the
patent.14
However, there is also a counternarrative in the literature that is supported with
data and analysis. There is an increasing realization among academics that this
“explosion” in patent litigation may be overblown. A major factor is the anti-joinder pro-
vision of the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).15 That provision required
that a patent holder file a separate lawsuit against each unrelated defendant,16 reversing
the practice of some courts that permitted unrelated defendants to be sued in a single
lawsuit.17 After the AIA was passed, there were an increased number of suits filed,18 as
12General Accounting Office, Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors that Affect Patent Infringement Litigation
Could Help Improve Patent Quality at 10 (August 2013) (http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf) (“parties
that do not offer products or services using the patents at issue often have far fewer documents to disclose---
because they do not have any documents related to their products or services---than patent owners or accused
infringers who do offer products or services”).
13Jim Spencer, Patent Trolls Collect “Nuisance Fees” and Political Enemies, Star Tribune, June 15, 2013 (http://
www.startribune.com/business/211615651.html) (“You end up with companies that aren’t making anything, try-
ing to extract a nuisance fee.”)
14Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
95 B.U. L. Rev. 279 (2015); see Innovation Act, Proposed Revision to 35 U.S.C. 299 (requiring that, upon a show-
ing that the patentee “has no substantial interest in the subject matter at issue other than asserting such patent
claim in litigation,” the other interested parties can be joined to the lawsuit to pay potential awards of attorney
fees.)
1535 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). See generally David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 652 (2013).
16Section 299, in relevant part, requires that accused infringers may be “joined in one action as defendants or
counterclaim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial, only if---(1) any right to relief is asserted
against the parties jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences relating to the making, using, importing into the United
States, offering for sale, or selling of the same accused product or process; and (2) questions of fact common to
all defendants or counterclaim defendants will arise in the action.”
17Fabio E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, Has Delaware Become the “New” Eastern District of Texas? The Unfore-
seen Consequences of the AIA, 30 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 527 (2014) (http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/
chtlj/vol30/iss4/3).
18Robin Feldman, Thomas Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Enti-
ties, 17 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1, 48 (2013) (reporting a spike of approximately 500 percent around September
2011, when the AIA was signed into law).
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each defendant needed to be sued in a separate lawsuit since many defendants could
no longer be joined in the same action.19 This largely ministerial change caused the
number of lawsuits to rapidly increase, while the underlying amount of litigation (i.e.,
the number of plaintiffs and the number of defendants) remained constant.20 After
accounting for the changes in the joinder provision, the apparent explosion of PAE
activity from 2010 until 2012 appears to be a mirage.21 There is also some recognition
in academic research—less so in the popular press—that not all “non-practicing entities”
are the same.22
But there has been little empirical investigation of the other allegations driving
the calls for legislation—that all patent trolls or PAEs behave the same in litigation and
seek early settlement and, in turn, act distinctively different from operating compa-
nies.23 For instance, do all PAEs settle their cases quickly?24 Do all PAEs avoid adjudica-
tion of their claims on the merits?25 More broadly, do all PAE lawsuits look the same
and, in turn, are they noticeably different from lawsuits asserted by other types of pat-
entees such as operating companies?26 It could be that within the full universe of PAEs,
one group, such as individual inventors, behave differently from other groups within
the broader category.27 For example, failed companies may litigate differently from
19There was an uptick in litigation after the joinder provisions were publicly announced and just before they
went into effect in Sept. 2011. Brian Howard, Year in Review, Continued Analysis, Lex Machina (July 23, 2014)
(https://lexmachina.com/2014/07/year-review-continued-analysis/).
20Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities, 99 Minn. L.
Rev. 649, 655 (2014) (“most of the differences between the years [2010 and 2012] are likely explained by, and
attributable to, a change in the joinder rules adopted in 2011 as part of the America Invents Act”).
21Id. at 660--73 (analyzing the patent litigation data based on number of lawsuit, number of patent owners, and
number of defendants).
22Id.; Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (2017)
(distinguishing among various business models of “patent trolls”); see also Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral
Panics, Motions in Limine, and Patent Reform, 19 Stanford Tech. L. Rev. (2016) (noting differences among types
of “patent trolls”).
23Ira Blumberg, Why Patent Trolls Won’t Give Up, Tech Crunch (June 5, 2016) (https://techcrunch.com/2016/
06/05/why-patent-trolls-wont-give-up/ (patent “trolls” are “aggressive” and “operate with near impunity”).
24James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers
in an Idea Economy, 56 Emory L.J. 189 (2006).
25For an analysis of adjudicated cases, see John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often Do Non-
Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits? Berkeley Tech. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (http://ssrn.com/abstract52750128).
26David Segal, Have Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. Times, July 13, 2013 (quoting the
owner of a PAE as saying that if there is enough resistance to an allegation of patent infringement, he can “go
thug. . . . Once you go thug, though, you can’t unthug”).
27Christopher A. Cotropia, Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 52 (2009)
(arguing that since its inception, patent law has viewed individual inventors as special in the innovation system).
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companies whose sole business purpose is to purchase patents.28 There is very little, if any,
empirical evidence to date that supports the current thinking on PAEs and provides a
detailed account as to how various patent entities behave during litigation.29 Answering
these questions with extensive data and robust empirical analysis is the focus of this article.
In this work, we present an empirical study of the relationship between the type
of patentee-plaintiffs and litigation behavior (e.g., settlement, duration, grant of sum-
mary judgment, trial, and procedural dispositions) in patent lawsuits to test the current
assumptions about PAEs as a group and as compared to operating companies. We take
into account, among other factors, the technology of the patents being asserted, the
judicial districts where these lawsuits were filed, the judge to whom the case was
assigned, and the lawyers representing the patent holder.30 Using a unique, hand-coded
dataset, we break down the different types of patentee-plaintiffs on a refined basis, dis-
tinguishing among operating companies, patent holding companies, large patent aggre-
gators, individual inventors, universities, and failed startups.31 To study the relationship
between patentee entity type and case progression and disposition, we employ a variety
of empirical approaches. We present summary statistics, regression results, and dura-
tion/survival analyses. As a result, we are able to provide a detailed picture of the rela-
tionship between the type of patentee-plaintiffs, choice of patented technology, and
venue and litigation outcomes, including settlement.
We recognize that the role of PAEs in the patent system is not confined to liti-
gation.32 It may be interesting to study patent grants,33 patent assignments and
related transactions among various entities,34 and patent demands that do not result
28Kristen J. Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the Patent Troll Rhetoric, 47 U. Conn. L. Rev.
435 (2015) (arguing that “formerly manufacturing entities do not impose the harms associated with patent trolls
more broadly and, in fact, provide unique benefits for commercialization of new technologies”).
29Laurie Self, Misleading Patent Troll Narrative Driven by Anecdote, Not Data, IPWatchdog (Nov. 12, 2015)
(http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/11/12/misleading-patent-troll-narrative-driven-by-anecdote-not-facts/
id563122/).
30As we explain in Section III, there are preexisting theories on why each of these variables may relate to the
decision to settle or press a patent infringement lawsuit.
31We use the same coding schema as Cotropia et al., supra note 20.
32For a broad overview of PAE-related transactions outside of litigation, see Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The
New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. Econ. Perspectives 45
(2013).
33Before the present debate about PAEs, researchers studied patent prosecution. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lem-
ley, Who’s Patenting What: An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2099 (2000)
34The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) recently released a dataset with assignment, security interest,
and other information that was recorded with the USPTO. No one, to our knowledge, has analyzed the PAE issue
using this new dataset. For information about the dataset, see Alan C. Marco, Amanda F. Myers, Stuart J.H. Gra-
ham, Paul A. D’Agostino & Kristen Apple, The USPTO Patent Assignment Dataset: Descriptions and Analysis
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id52636461).
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in litigation.35 However, most of the charges about PAEs are focused on litigation
abuses by patent holders. As such, we focused our initial inquiry on PAE litigation
behavior, focusing on cases that resulted in a settlement or other voluntary disposi-
tion. Most patent cases settle and we think that studying settlement behavior is the
best way to understand the PAE litigation ecosystem, especially since much of the
anecdotal evidence relates to nuisance fee settlements. We also report information on
the small subset (less than 10 percent) of defendants whose cases reach a substantive
outcome. We are cautious about extrapolating too much from this small subset, which
most scholars theorize is skewed relative to the population of all lawsuits.36 We are
not aware of other prior academic research on settled PAE patent cases, and we
believe that our study is substantially different from and, in important ways, repre-
sents an advance over, studies that focus only on the small subset of adjudicated
disputes.
In sum, and counter to the some of the current assumptions about PAEs in
the literature, we find significant heterogeneity among different patent holder
entity types, both between various types of PAEs and as compared to operating com-
panies. Individual inventors, failed operating companies, patent holding compa-
nies, and large patent aggregators each have distinct strategies largely consistent
with their economic posture and incentives.37 These PAEs appear to litigate differ-
ently from each other and from operating companies. At minimum, the notion that
patent holders fall into two categories—operating companies and PAEs/non-prac-
ticing entities—is deeply flawed. Hence, we urge that to the extent any patent pol-
icy reform targets specific patent plaintiff types, it should go beyond the practicing
entity versus non-practicing entity distinction and understand how the proposed
legislation would impact more granular and meaningful categories of patent
owners.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, we propose an
economic explanation of the litigation incentives for the disparate types of patent hold-
ers. We continue, in Section III, by setting forth our study design and methodology.
Next, in Section IV, we provide the results of the study. The results include information
about case duration and case dispositions. We discuss implications in Section V. We
briefly conclude in Section VI.
35Professor Robin Feldman surveyed venture capitalists about patent demands. See Robin Feldman, Patent
Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the Venture Capital Community, 16 Yale J.L. & Tech. 236
(2014).
36George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 16--17 (1984).
Others have criticized parts of the Priest-Klein theory. See, e.g., Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Daniel M. Klerman, The
Priest-Klein Hypotheses: Proofs and Generality, 47 Int’l Rev. of L. & Econ. 59 (2016).
37We discuss these economic motivations in Section II.
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II. Economic Motivations of Patent Holders
in Litigation
In this section, we expound a basic economic theory of how various patent holders
might be expected to litigate.38 We provide separate theories for operating companies,
patent holding companies, large aggregators, individual inventors, and other types of
patent plaintiffs.39
Until very recently, patent litigation was primarily between operating companies offer-
ing goods and services in the same technology sector.40 For instance, until about 2008–
2009, there were four times as many operating companies as there were non-operating
companies filing patent lawsuits.41 While each case is different, often when an operating
company sued another operating company, the stakes and overall litigation exposure of
both parties were quite symmetric.42 The defendant entity in this scenario may assert a pat-
ent infringement counterclaim based on its patent portfolio and thereby even the liability
exposure for both sides.43 The discovery costs (such as e-discovery, documentary evidence,
depositions, and experts) and challenges of proving infringement vel non were also symmet-
ric.44 Remedies including reasonable royalty estimates, lost profit claims, possible price ero-
sion, injunctive relief, and willful infringement were equally available to both patent-
plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants, since they were both operating companies.45
This scenario becomes considerably more asymmetric when the patent plaintiff is
not an operating company.46 An individual inventor, a research university, a failed
38See Kenneth Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. Legal Studies 247, 247--49 (1994) (detail-
ing various economic theories of patent law).
39These theories were discussed briefly in our earlier work. See Cotropia et al., supra note 20.
40See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Golaiths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of
High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571, 1574 (detailing this historic “sport of kings”).
41See Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, Studying the Impact of eBay v. MercExchange on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases
(2016) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id52816701) (showing the number of lawsuits filed by
operating companies and non-practicing entities from 2000--2012 in Figure 5).
42See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 Geo. L.J. 435, 474 (2004) (finding that semiconductor patents
are litigated only one-third as often as other patents, and offering the symmetry of relationships as an explanation).
43See Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 611, 615 (one of
the assumptions corporations in patent intensive industries (such as IT or, increasingly, biotechnology) make
about patenting is symmetry: that if a competitor sues you for infringement you can sue them back).
44James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 387, 413 (2014)
(“NPEs have a bargaining advantage over practicing-entity patent plaintiffs because NPEs are invulnerable to pat-
ent counterclaims and have lower litigation costs, especially discovery costs”).
45Id.
46Id. at 412--13 (detailing the bargaining advantage due to this asymmetry for NPEs).
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startup, or a patent holding company that does not make goods or offer services is not
exposed to a patent infringement counterclaim.47 As a result, the defendant is limited
in terms of increasing the litigation risk and exposure of the plaintiff.48 The discovery
costs become more asymmetric as the patent plaintiff may not possess significant docu-
mentary evidence to turn over to the defendant, although it still bears the costs of prov-
ing infringement based on the defendant’s evidence.49 In addition, the available remedy
that must be proven by the plaintiff is limited in this scenario since it most often com-
prises an estimate of the reasonable royalty for past and future sales.50 In short, when a
non-operating company sues an operating company for patent infringement, the costs
involved and the litigation stakes may be more asymmetric compared to a patent lawsuit
between two operating companies.51
That said, all non-operating companies are far from being similarly situated. The
motivations of different types of non-operating, non-practicing companies vary greatly.52
For instance, when a patent holding company or large aggregator of patents (also
referred to as a patent assertion entity) is the plaintiff, there are several relevant factors
at play that influence the outcome of the patent lawsuit.53 First, the patent holding com-
pany may create a new entity for holding the patents that are asserted in the lawsuit,
thereby minimizing the discovery burden and the downside litigation exposure. The
new entity has few assets other than the patents and may be dissolved in the event the
lawsuit fails. The lack of potential downside risk from their limited liability status may
encourage riskier patent owner behavior, resulting in cases that last longer and more
adjudications on the merits. Second, the patent holding company may be able to spread
any potential loss arising from this lawsuit over many other patent lawsuits involving the
same patent portfolio. Thus, the patentee’s costs may be lower, permitting it to litigate
longer and at a cheaper cost. In addition, large patent aggregators, companies who pur-
chase and aggregate numerous patent portfolios from various sources, may be monetiz-
ing several other patent portfolios and can spread their risks even more widely.54 Third,
47Lemley, supra note 43, at 615--16 (detailing the lack of symmetry for patentees such as universities).
48See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 159, 160 (2007) (noting this difference in risk).
49Bessen & Meurer, supra note 44, at 412--13.
50See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101
Iowa L. Rev. 1949 (2016) (establishing the de facto use requirement for an injunction empirically).
51Bessen & Meurer, supra note 44, at 412--13.
52David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 425, 429--30 (2014) (discussing some of these differences between assertion entity types).
53David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 51, 56--61 (2014) (noting the com-
plexity of the mass aggregators role in the patent system).
54Id. at 56--57.
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since the patent holding company is a third-party purchaser and not the inventor, it
does not have to contend with any issues related to the genesis of the invention(s) that
resulted in the asserted patent(s) and is insulated from any litigation issues related to
the inventors. As the cases reach adjudication on the merits, especially trial, the lack of
an “inventor story” may disadvantage patent purchasers, resulting in a lower win rate.
Fourth, a large aggregator may be seen by a defendant to be a repeat player in the
world of patent litigation and thus the defendant’s strategies (such as aggressively con-
tinuing the lawsuit or offering a settlement) will take that into account. Moreover, the
large aggregator will also consider the possibility that it may have to sue the same defen-
dant again in connection with another patent portfolio. In short, a large aggregator can
pursue a patent monetization strategy that is highly diversified, with reduced risk, involv-
ing cumulative assimilation of specialized knowledge over time.55 The repeat-player
nature of large aggregators may result in more settlements, and quicker settlements,
since the parties know each other and expect to continue to interact with each other in
the future.
Individual inventors, research universities, and failed startups, while falling within
the broad rubric of non-operating companies, find themselves in a very different posi-
tion compared to a patent holding company and large aggregators.56 First, the patents
that are asserted by them in litigation are the result of their own research efforts and
their involvement in the development of the underlying technology. The resulting pat-
ents being asserted are of personal importance and their association with the patents
are often intimate.57 Consequently, these entities may be inclined to overvalue their pat-
ents and their exclusivity in the market, a phenomenon that is referred to as the inven-
tors’/creators’ endowment effect.58 As a result, individual inventors and other similar
entities may be inclined to continue litigating a patent case (including spurning a settle-
ment offer), even if continued litigation is not in their objective best interest. Such over-
optimistic behavior may lead to higher loss rates for individual inventors. Second, unlike
patent holding companies, the patents that individual inventors, universities, and failed
startups choose to monetize are necessarily limited in number since they can typically
only assert patents that arise from technologies created by them. Third, individual inven-
tors, universities, and failed startups may be seen to be rare patent plaintiffs, and thus
defendants may be incentivized to continue to litigate these patent cases or not offer a
55Id. at 60--65 (describing this monetization strategy).
56See, e.g., Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior by Individual
Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation, U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No.
LE09-005; Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 08--21 (Feb. 1, 2009) (http://ssrn.com/abstract51337166).
57Chien, supra note 40, at 1586--87 (“some independent inventors are perceived as seeking not only money, the
main objective of licensing shops, but also justice or vindication by a court”).
58See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 Cornell
L. Rev. 1, 17--31 (2010) (conducting experiments “that demonstrated a substantial valuation asymmetry between
authors of poems and potential purchasers of them”).
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meaningful settlement, knowing that these entities are less sophisticated litigants against
whom they may never have to litigate again.59 These aspects of their interaction may
result in longer case durations, with greater numbers of cases reaching a substantive
disposition.
There is even a diversity among individual inventors, research universities, and
failed startups. Universities’ primary business is in education and research, not patent
enforcement, and their reputation is very important.60 Failed startups, in contrast, have
little ongoing business. They may feel that the alleged infringer unfairly beat them in
the marketplace. The alleged infringer may have the opposite view of the marketplace
battle, and these underlying divergent views may affect the patent case. This divergence
in views between failed startup plaintiffs and defendants may make disputes more diffi-
cult to settle, resulting in longer disputes. Failed startups also have investors who may
desire some return, via the patent lawsuit, on their otherwise lost capital.61 Even within
individual patent holders, there is diversity. Individual inventors sue in their personal
capacity (i.e., John Doe) or they can form a corporate vehicle (i.e., John Doe LLC).
Those with access to sophisticated counsel are likely to be advised to form a corporate
vehicle.62 Those without may even litigate pro se, representing themselves in the litiga-
tion. Defendants may litigate against individuals, especially pro se individuals, quite dif-
ferently. They may be less willing to offer meaningful settlements and take more
aggressive litigation positions.
We pause here to acknowledge that not all patents are created equal, and that pat-
ents are not randomly assigned to companies. Even before litigation, some patents are
more likely to be valid than others. Some parties may be more willing to enforce a pat-
ent that has suspect validity, or assert a weak claim of infringement, than other parties.
Non-practicing entities that purchase patents from others have the ability to select which
patents to purchase, while many operating companies have limited themselves to the
patented technologies they have invented.63 Thus, even before the litigation process,
the various patent owners may carry patents of varying quality. We cannot observe this
underlying quality, and suggest caution in comparing litigation outcomes (including set-
tlements) among entity types.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a straightforward examination of the
economic incentives faced by different types of patent plaintiffs to settle or to
59See Mark Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 709, 710--11 (2012) (detailing the rarity of
truly individual inventions).
60Cleopatra Veloutsou et al., University Selection: Information Requirements and Importance, 18 Int’l J. Educ.
Mgmt. 160, 161 (noting that applicants consider reputation when selecting universities).
61See John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U.
J. Sci. & Tech. L. 170, 172 (2006) (noting that patent assertion is a viable exit strategy for failed startups).
62See Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 979 (1971).
63David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 51, 63 (2014) (arguing that non-
practicing entities may be purchasing undervalued patents).
89Heterogeneity Among Patent Plaintiffs
continue to litigate a patent case even to trial can be distinctly different.64 Therefore,
dividing the world of patent plaintiffs into binary categories—operating entities and
non-operating entities—as a way to understand behaviors in patent litigation may
well be unjustifiable and misguided or, at the very least, less than illuminating and
incomplete. More granular categories of patent plaintiffs will necessarily be more
revealing.
III. Study Design and Methodology
In the following section, we set forth how data were located, collected, and coded. Our
work here expands on a unique dataset we previously collected by hand. As described in
detail elsewhere,65 the authors previously spent several weeks personally attending to
gathering information about all patent lawsuits brought in 2010 and 2012. For the sake
of comprehensiveness, we briefly review the contents of the unique dataset with particu-
lar emphasis on additional information about the lawsuits that we added for the present
study.
In what follows, we explain the contours of our initial dataset and the additional
coding we conducted for this article.
A. The Previously Collected Data
The previously collected dataset includes information from all patent infringement law-
suits filed in two complete calendar years: 2010 and 2012. We used Bloomberg Law’s
Federal Docket Database to identify the patent lawsuits filed in these years.66 We verified
that Bloomberg Law’s database was substantially identical to that of PACER,67 the data-
base maintained by the federal courts.68
For the present study, we focus on only lawsuits filed in 2010 because almost all
the lawsuits filed then have been resolved, permitting us to investigate outcomes, settle-
ments, and other information related to litigation. Of course, if we had chosen a more
recent year, a much larger number of cases would still be pending, reducing our ability
to observe settlement and judgment patterns. Lawsuits filed in 2010 are, nevertheless,
64See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 457, 458--59 (2012) (noting the variety of non-
practicing entities that may assert patents).
65Cotropia et al., supra note 20 at 660--73.
66We limited the docket search on Bloomberg Law to lawsuits between Jan. 1 and Dec. 31 of the given year. We
used the Nature of Suit field to isolate “830 -- Patent” cases.
67PACER stands for Public Access to Court Electronic Records. It is an electronic database that permits access to
federal courts. Access is available at https://www.pacer.gov/.
68See Cotropia et al., supra note 20 at 663--64.
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relatively recent.69 Although there are reasons to think that recent changes, including
adjustments to the law of patentable subject matter,70 joinder,71 and administrative
reviews of patents,72 are significant, our results indicate an accurate portrayal of patent
litigation in 2010. We contend that information about patent litigation in 2010 has con-
tinued relevance toward understanding what patent litigation looks like in 2016.73 More
importantly, patent litigation in 2010 provides a telling snapshot of economic incentives
of a plaintiff related to settlement and case duration and progression.
For every lawsuit, we reviewed the docket report and a copy of the complaint,
amended complaints, answers, and amended answers. The complaint is the legal docu-
ment that initiates a lawsuit,74 and the answer is the legal response filed by the defen-
dant to the lawsuit’s allegations.75 While the complaint frequently does not contain
detailed factual contentions, it always identifies the parties to the lawsuits, and some-
times includes background information about the parties.76 We eliminated several types
of cases from the dataset, including all complaints alleging patent false marking,77
69In many areas of law, one may expect lawsuits filed today to be resolved similarly to lawsuits filed six years ago.
However, patent law may be different. Several major changes have occurred in the last six years, including the
rise of inter partes review (IPR) that is concurrent with much patent litigation, and the Supreme Court decision
in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Furthermore, the pleading standards for patent cases
changed in Dec. 2015, when revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect.
70There are several Supreme Court consequential cases since 2010. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct.
2347 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
71The America Invents Act (AIA) requires that lawsuits filed against multiple unrelated parties are filed sepa-
rately. 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). For example, in 2010, while a patentee could sue three defendants in one patent
lawsuit in some venues, after the implementation of the AIA, the same patentee may have to sue each defendant
separately, resulting in three patent lawsuits. The number of defendants in a lawsuit may relate to the measured
variables, including duration.
72The America Invents Act created new forms of administrative review and modified existing ones. More specifically,
the AIA created post-grant review and covered business method review. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b); 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). It
also established inter partes review, 35 U.S.C. § 311(a), and supplemental examination, 35 U.S.C. § 257.
73In 2010, the advent of non-practicing entities in patent litigation in significant numbers was well underway, see
supra note 41.
74Complaint, Legal info. Inst. (http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/complaint/). The requirements for notice plead-
ing in complaints is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
75Answer, Legal info. Inst. (http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/answer/). The rules for answers are set forth in
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9.
76Id.; see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 8--10.
77False marking disputes are cases in which someone, often a member of the general public, complains that a com-
pany labeled its product as “patented” when, in fact, no unexpired patent covered the product. The issues in patent
false marking cases are quite different from disputes about whether a party infringes a patent. For instance, the valid-
ity of the patent is not at issue in patent false marking cases. Many of the cases involved companies that, without bad
intent, continued to mark their products with a patent number even though the patent had expired. In these cases,
infringement was not at issue either. Furthermore, none of the current debate about PAEs involves claims about false
marking. Consequently, we thought it best to remove these cases from the dataset.
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complaints alleging only design (and not utility) patents,78 non-patent infringement alle-
gations (i.e., legal malpractice,79 inventorship disputes,80 demands for patent term
adjustments,81 interferences,82 motions to quash or enforce subpoenas,83 other actions
against the Patent Office, and mislabeled trademark and copyright infringement
actions84), and duplicate cases (i.e., mirror-image complaints for patent infringement
and declaratory judgment actions for no patent infringement85 involving the same pat-
ents and parties). After elimination, our dataset contained 2,520 patent infringement
lawsuits in 2010.
We obtained certain specific information for each lawsuit from Bloomberg Law.
We recorded the judicial district86 in which the lawsuit was brought, the judge
assigned to the case, the civil action number, the filing date of the lawsuit, the utility
patent numbers asserted in the lawsuit,87 and a list of all parties to the lawsuit. Patent
numbers asserted in the 2010 cases were used to categorize the lawsuits by
technology.88
78Design patents cover ornamental aspects of articles of manufacture, in contrast to the functional aspect. For a
thorough discussion of the history of design patent law, see Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janus, Origins of Ameri-
can Design Patent Protection, 88 Ind. L.J. 837 (2013).
79In 2013, the Supreme Court clarified that actions alleging malpractice in the handling of a patent case do not
arise under federal law. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 310 (2013).
80Inventorship can be challenged in the federal courts. See 35 U.S.C. § 256; Thomas M. Morrow, Challenging
Inventorship in Patent Litigation, HIPLA Fall Institute (Oct. 5, 2012) (http://www.hipla.org/Morrow_Thomas.
pdf). These cases do not involve contested issues of infringement or validity, and the debate about PAEs does
not touch directly on false inventorship issues.
81Patent owners can contest the term of the patent and challenge whether an extension is owed. See, e.g., 35
U.S.C. § 154(b).
82A patent interference is a proceeding within the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office to determine which of multi-
ple applicants is entitled to a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a).
83Parties may move to quash a subpoena pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
84Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudica-
tion and Settlement of Patent Cases, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 237, 261 tbl. 1 (2006) (noting that a small number of
trademark and copyright cases are miscoded as patent cases in PACER).
85An accused infringer can initiate a lawsuit seeking a declaration of non-infringement, invalidity, or unenforce-
ability, provided that there is a sufficient case or controversy between the parties. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Gen-
entech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
86There are 94 separate judicial districts in the federal courts.
87The complaints included an explicit identification of the patents-in-suit.
88Information about the NBER patent classification can be found in B.H. Hall, A. B. Jaffe & M. Trajtenberg, The
NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, NBER Working Paper 8498 (2001).
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We hand coded the defendants in the 2010 patent lawsuits. To hand code them,
we relied on the complaint, and any amended complaints, for each coded lawsuit and
counted the number of defendants listed. We included in the defendant count any
party identified by the plaintiff(s) as a defendant in the complaint.89 For declaratory
judgment cases,90 we counted plaintiffs as “defendants.” A defendant was counted as a
“defendant” even if that party was dismissed from a lawsuit.91
Then, we determined the type of patent holder involved in the lawsuit. We classified all
patent holders into one and only one of the following groups: (1) University; (2) Individual
Inventor; (3) Large Patent Aggregator; (4) Failed Operating or Startup Company; (5) Patent
Holding Company; (6) Operating Company; and (7) Technology Development Company.92
Below is a brief description of each category:
1. University: A public or private institution of higher learning. It includes foreign
and domestic institutions.93 An example is Cornell University.
2. Individual Inventor: One or more inventors who own(s) a patent (i.e., it is unas-
signed to a company). Often, the party to the litigation would be an individual
litigating in his individual capacity. We also included family trusts in this cate-
gory. Additionally, if it appeared that an individual had formed a corporate
vehicle that she completely controlled for the primary purposes of litigation, we
coded this as an individual, and we also created a separate subcategory of indi-
viduals litigating in a corporate capacity. This arose when the name of the cor-
porate vehicle included the name of the Individual Inventor and no products
were being sold. For instance, Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, L.P.
(RAKTL) asserts patents invented by Ronald A. Katz.94 While Ronald Katz does
89Unfortunately, it was not feasible to exclude “related” defendants. Thus, if two distinct yet apparently related
corporate entities (i.e., LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics USA Inc.) appeared as separate defendants, we
counted those as two defendants. In follow-on research, we are manually identifying such related parties to per-
mit them to be removed, when appropriate.
90Typically, declaratory judgment cases are brought under jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2202.
91We included dismissals with and without prejudice.
92To determine the proper classification for a plaintiff we looked at several sources. First, we reviewed the complaint filed
in the lawsuit. Sometimes, the complaint mentioned whether products were being manufactured by the patent holder
and whether those products were covered by the patents at issue. If the complaint made that sort of statement, then we
coded the patent holder as an Operating Company. When the complaint was silent (as it was in the majority of cases),
we used web searches to obtain information about the patent holder. If the patent holder had a website indicating that it
manufactured products, then we classified it as an Operating Company.
93We do not believe that any of the entities we categorized as universities were instead patent holding companies
that were named to sound like universities. We reviewed the complaints for all cases and the complaints con-
tained recitations of each party in the case. The recitation of universities typically indicated something along the
lines that they were not-for-profit educational institutions.
94See Company Overview of Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, L.P., Bloomberg Businessweek (http://inves-
ting.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId57672486, last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
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not technically hold these patents in his individual capacity, we believe that
RAKTL is best understood as an Individual Inventor. Sometimes, our review of
corporate records revealed that the Individual Inventor owned all shares of the
corporation. Unfortunately, such corporate records were not available for all
companies, especially for companies we identified as Patent Holding Compa-
nies. Consequently, we suspect we may undercount the number of individuals
litigating in a corporate capacity and, similarly, overcount Patent Holding
Companies.
3. Large Patent Aggregator: A company with a large patent portfolio whose primary
business is enforcing patents of numerous other individuals and entities.95 This
includes Acacia companies, Wi-Lan, and Intellectual Ventures. We believe that
there are few to no false positives in our coding of Large Patent Aggregators.
All the entities that we identify as Large Patent Aggregators are indeed so. How-
ever, we acknowledge that there may be some false negatives. There may be
companies that are affiliated with a larger patent enforcer, but that relationship
is not evident from the publicly available sources we consulted.
4. Failed Operating or Startup Company: A company that originally invented the
patent-in-suit and attempted to commercialize the technology. At present, the
company sells no products, and its primary business appears to be patent litiga-
tion. An example of a Failed Operating or Startup Company is Broadband
Graphics LLC.
5. Patent Holding Company: Typically, limited liability companies that appear to
have been formed solely to hold and enforce a patent or small portfolio of pat-
ents. As far as we can tell, the original inventor does not own these companies.
Frequently, these companies were formed shortly before litigation was com-
menced. Because pubic information about private companies is difficult to
obtain, we cannot rule out that some entities that we classified as Patent Hold-
ing Companies are instead either Individual Inventors who formed a corporate
non-practicing vehicle to enforce their patents or Large Patent Aggregators
who formed separate entities for different patent portfolios. We believe, how-
ever, that most of the entities we have classified as Patent Holding Companies
are one-off companies asserting patent rights that they obtained from another.
6. Operating Company: Companies that manufacture products or deliver services
(other than licensing patents). An example of an Operating Company is Hew-
lett Packard. We have not analyzed whether the Operating Company is actually
making use of the patent-in-suit.96 We also included IP holding companies
95The line between Patent Holding Company and Aggregator is not completely clear. We generally used the
Aggregator category sparingly, limiting it to companies that had assembled via acquisition of portfolios hundreds
of patents or more.
96We know that some operating companies assert patents that they do not utilize in their business operations.
See Ted M. Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 543
(2014).
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owned by manufacturing companies in this category. For instance, AT&T Intel-
lectual Property I, L.P. was considered an Operating Company.97
7. Technology Development Company: A company that invested in the development of
technology, perhaps with the intention of licensing rather than commercializing.
A Technology Development Company is the original owner of the patents but
does not manufacture products covered by the patents. Examples of Technology
Development Companies are Walker Digital LLC and Tessera Technologies.
As previously reported, our intercoder reliability for the coding of patentee entity
types is high.98
Our data are publicly available at http://www.npedata.com, and the data have
been downloaded by hundreds of users, including legal and business scholars, employ-
ees of governmental agencies, consultants, lawyers, and interested members of the pub-
lic.99 Since the data’s public release, the coding schema (and the raw data) has been
used in academic studies by many researchers.100 Some of these researchers have used
the specific codings we performed for the 2010 and 2012 patent litigation data in their
own research.101 Others have taken our coding schema and used it to code other, raw
97There were only 150 defendants that were sued by IP holding companies of manufacturing companies. As a
robustness check, we performed all statistical analysis both separating IP holding companies owned by
manufacturing companies and combining them with operating companies. The results were entirely consistent.
Because we believe these entities are very close to the manufacturing companies---they typically report to the
same management---we report in this article only the combined results.
98The three co-authors personally coded the entity types of the patent holders, with each co-author completing
slightly more than one-third of the lawsuits.
99The three co-authors maintain the website npedata.com. As of July 17, 2017, 346 individuals had registered to
download the data.
100See, e.g., Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott D. Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms
(http://www.nber.org/papers/w20322) (working with “hand-coded, finely classified public data assembled by
Cotropia et al. (2014)”); Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An
Empirical Study, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1949, 1987 (2016) (“This study classified each patent holder into one of eight
categories based on a classification system developed in a recent empirical study by Christopher Cotropia, Jay
Kesan, and David Schwartz regarding the role of PAEs in the patent system.”); Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing
Royalties in Patent Cases After eBay: An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 Texas. Intell. Prop.
L.J. 203, 236 (2015) (explaining that the empirical study article relied “on the coding methodology developed by
Professors Chris Cotropia, Jay Kesan, and David Schwartz”); Hannah Jiam, Fee-Shifting and Octane Fitness: An
Empirical Approach Toward Understanding “Exceptional,” 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 611, 628 n91 (2015) (using “a
dataset compiled by Christopher A. Cotropia et al.” to determine if an entity was an NPE); Jay P. Kesan & Kirti
Gupta, Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id52629399) (“We utilize a systematic methodology for identifying potential non-manufacturing
entities, as explained by Cotropia, Kesan and Schwartz.”). See also Stephen Kiebzak, Greg Rafert & Catherine
Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity, 45 Research
Policy 218 (2016) (noting that the Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz classification system is more nuanced than the
coding schema used by the authors, but arguing that the schema used in the article was sufficient for the claims
the article is testing).
101See, e.g., Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott D. Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms
(http://www.nber.org/papers/w20322).
95Heterogeneity Among Patent Plaintiffs
patent litigation data.102 We have also “crowd-sourced” testing of the robustness of the
coding schema and the actual coding itself through significant feedback on the publicly
available dataset.103
We recognize that there are other classifications of patent holders upon which some
scholars rely. For instance, one of us, in other work with John Allison and Mark Lemley,
has coded patent owners using a slightly different schema.104 There is much overlap
between all the coding schemes of patent plaintiffs, including separating universities from
other types of non-practicing entities. However, the coding schema used in the present
study is more granular in a key aspect that is relevant to our area of inquiry. More specifi-
cally, our coding schema attempts to separate patent aggregators from more run-of-the-
mill patent holding companies. Other classification systems do not separate these entity
types. We believe that the behaviors of these two types of patent holders may systematically
differ, and we exploit the separation of these entity types in the results that follow.
B. Enhanced Data
For the present article, we gathered new information about the 2010 patent lawsuits.
More precisely, we gathered information about when and how each defendant in each
lawsuit exited the lawsuit. It is important to emphasize that we gathered this information
on a per-defendant basis, not on a per-lawsuit basis. Thus, if a lawsuit had five unrelated
defendants, we would record separate disposition information for each of the five
defendants. Our dataset includes 9,101 defendants in total, not all of whom are unique.
If, instead, we had gathered the information on a per-lawsuit basis, we would capture
only information about the last defendant to settle or exit the lawsuit. Although it was
substantially more time intensive for us to gather information on a per-defendant basis,
we believe that this information is significantly more useful when analyzing patent litiga-
tion. A majority of the 2010 lawsuits involved multiple defendants.105 If most defendants
settled earlier than the final defendant, then using a per-lawsuit method may substan-
tially overestimate case durations. On the other hand, if most defendants settled early,
but one defendant litigated the case until judgment, then reviewing only the judgment
would not completely or accurately represent the litigation. A large number of early set-
tlements may show evidence of patentees’ strategic behavior that would otherwise be
missed by viewing the data on a per-lawsuit basis. Again, only by evaluating data on a
per-defendant basis can patent litigation be comprehensively unpacked and untangled.
102See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases after eBay: An Empirical Assessment and
Proposed Framework, 23 Texas. Intell. Prop. L.J. 203, 236 (2015).
103See Cotropia et al., supra note 20, at 690--91 (detailing this feedback we have obtained on the data and our
responses to such feedback).
104See supra note 25.
105One-thousand-three-hundred-sixty-four of the 2,520 (54.13 percent) cases in 2010 included two or more
defendants.
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For each defendant, we identified the date that the party entered the case and
exited the case. The entrance date is the date of the first complaint naming the party,
which is typically the original date of the lawsuit.106 Sometimes, a party is added after the
original filing date via an amended complaint.107 In such instances, we used the date of fil-
ing of the amended complaint.108 The date of exit from a lawsuit is the date that the party
was dismissed from the lawsuit. In most instances, there is a voluntary dismissal entered by
the court,109 presumably and often clearly following a settlement agreement.110 We used
the date of an actual dismissal as the exit date.111 In lawsuits without dismissal, we used
the date of judgment by the district court.112 From the entry and exit dates, we deter-
mined the case duration for each party in each lawsuit filed in 2010.113
We also recorded the reason for the dismissal of each defendant from the lawsuit.
There are many reasons that a defendant may exit a case, and we call this reason the
“disposition.” We recorded this information on a very granular level. For simplicity, we
group these types of dispositions into three categories: (1) voluntary dispositions; (2)
procedural dispositions; and (3) substantive dispositions. Voluntary dispositions include
stipulated dismissals and voluntary dismissals by the patent holder. Procedural disposi-
tions include dismissals for lack of standing,114 improper joinder,115 lack of personal
jurisdiction,116 and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.117 We classified default
106The complaint is typically the first document filed in PACER. It always identifies the defendant to the lawsuit,
both in the caption and in the text.
107Amended complaints are covered by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Leave is freely given to parties to amend their com-
plaints. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
108A small number of cases had “John Doe” defendants. If a defendant was later substituted in place of a John
Doe defendant, we used the date that the defendant was specifically named in a complaint as the entrance date.
109Voluntary dismissals are pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.
110Private settlement agreements typically include a provision that the parties will dismiss pending lawsuits. For
an example of such a settlement agreement, see Section 8 at https://images.template.net/wp-content/uploads/
2016/03/24054857/Confidential-Settlement-of-Known-Unknown-Claims.pdf.
111Rarely, there was a motion for violation of a settlement agreement. We did not consider the case still open if
such a motion was filed. Once the party was dismissed from the lawsuit, even if there was a later dispute, we
counted the party as having resolved the lawsuit.
112Judgment is a term of art. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.
113More precisely, to determine the duration of a party, we subtracted the party’s exit date from its entry date. It
is the raw number of days between these two milestones. We did not adjust for weekends or holidays.
114A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is typically brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
115A motion to dismiss for improper joinder is typically brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
116A motion to dismiss for personal jurisdiction is typically brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
117A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is typically brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
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judgments,118 which occur when the defendant does not appear in court to answer the
complaint, as procedural dispositions. Substantive dispositions include trial outcomes119
and grants of summary judgment120 on merits issues. We also included the small num-
ber of cases decided under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim as substantive dis-
positions. There were a small number of defendants—245—that were still pending
when we completed our coding in November 2015.121 We report some information on
these pending defendants in Figure 5. For our analysis, we right censored the data by
assuming that the close date of these defendants is November 2015.122
We recorded if the case had been stayed123 or transferred.124 Stayed and trans-
ferred cases lasted longer than run-of-the-mill cases. Much of the delay was caused by
the stay or transfer itself. For that reason, we omit stayed and transferred cases from the
analysis below, unless we specify otherwise.
We made another important classification of defendants. Many times, a patent
owner asserts infringement against multiple, related parties. For instance, a patentee
may sue Fujitsu America, Inc., and Fujitsu Components America, Inc.125 These compa-
nies are frequently represented by the same counsel, and they enter and exit the case
on the same date.126 These entities, when they file papers in the litigation, always file a
joint brief, motion, or other filing.127 For the purposes of our analysis, we had concerns
118A default judgment, entered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, is typically entered when a party fails to plead or other-
wise defend in a litigation.
119We include both bench and jury trials under the category of trials.
120A motion for summary judgment is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A party is entitled to summary judgment
on an issue if there is no genuine dispute as to material fact on that issue, and the law favors the moving party.
121See Section IV.A.1.
122As a robustness check, we also analyzed the data assuming that all open defendants reached a substantive dis-
position. Because the number of open cases was large relative to the number of substantive dispositions, our
results with respect to individual inventors on substantive dispositions lost significance when assuming that all
open cases would reach a substantive disposition. We believe that such an assumption is too conservative as even
cases that pend for a long period of time frequently settle. However, one should know that this result is more vul-
nerable than others to what transpires in the open cases.
123Courts have inherent power to stay or pause litigation. Courts may stay litigation if, for instance, the U.S. Pat-
ent & Trademark Office is reexamining the patent in suit. See Wayne O. Stacy, Reexamination Reality: How the
Courts Should Approach a Motion to Stay Pending the Outcome of Reexamination, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 172
(1997).
124Cases can be transferred from one judicial district to another, through, for instance, 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
125These defendants are parties to PACID Group, LLC v. Asustek Computer Inc. et al (6--10-cv-00108) (E.D.
Texas).
126These defendants are both represented by Christopher M. Joe of Buether Joe & Carpenter. They were both
dismissed on Feb. 1, 2011 through a single court order, in response to a joint motion by these defendants.
127These defendants, for instance, filed a joint motion to extend time to answer, at docket entry 55.
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about considering the two Fujitsu parties as two defendants. We are primarily measuring
case duration, settlement behavior, and adjudications. The costs for these two defend-
ants are likely the same as if either one were sued. The burden on the court and the
plaintiff is similarly the same for one or two parties. In fact, it appears that multiple,
related parties are often sued because plaintiffs may be overly cautious, desiring to make
sure that there is no possibility of naming the wrong defendant. For that reason, we
chose to collapse related defendants into a single defendant for the purposes of our
analysis.
To collapse related defendants into a single defendant, we identified “related”
defendants using two different definitions, one broad and one narrow. Our narrow defi-
nition of related defendants required that the parties share a root name, like the Fujitsu
example above,128 and enter and exit the case on the same dates. If two parties fit our
narrow definition of related defendants, we would exclude one of the two for our analy-
sis. Our broad definition of related defendants included everything in the narrow defini-
tion, and a small number of additional parties. The broad definition included multiple
defendants where one defendant owned another, even if they did not share the same
name. For instance, in one lawsuit, the patentee sued the American Broadcasting Com-
pany (ABC), as well as various Disney entities.129 Disney owns ABC,130 so we identified
ABC within our broad category of related defendants. We recognize that the ABC and
Disney defendants may be duplicative for the same reasons that we identify above with
respect to narrow defendants. However, these defendants may make different allegedly
infringing products, requiring additional time for the court and the parties. It is not fea-
sible for us to investigate each of these defendants more fully; consequently, we identify
them as broadly related.
In the results section, we identified where we exclude related defendants using
the narrow definition. In unreported results, we analyzed the data using the broad defi-
nition of related parties. There are no material differences in the results, given that few
defendants fell within our broad definition and not our narrow definition.131
Finally, we supplemented our dataset with information about the lawyers and law
firms who represented the parties in the cases. Docket Navigator provided us with a list
of every attorney who ever represented a party in a 2010 lawsuit.132 We matched these
attorneys to our cases. Some of the individual inventors in our dataset represented
128See supra note 125.
129See Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-00146 in the Southern District of California.
130See Geraldine Fabrikant, Walt Disney to Acquire ABC in $19 Billion Deal to Build a Giant for Entertainment,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1995 (http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/01/business/media-business-merger-walt-disney-
acquire-abc-19-billion-deal-build-giant-for.html?pagewanted5all).
131In fact, only 45 defendants fell within the broad definition as compared to the narrow definition.
132Docket Navigator obtained the attorney information from PACER. It includes all attorneys who filed appearan-
ces in the case, including trial and local counsel, as well as counsel whose representation was terminated before
the conclusion of the case. Docket Navigator provided us a list of attorneys and their respective law firms.
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themselves as pro se litigants.133 A case was deemed pro se if the patent holder was an
individual inventor,134 the lawyer’s name was the individual inventor, and there was no
law firm identification present.
IV. Results and Analysis
A. Influence of Patentee Entity Type on Overall Case Progression
Based on our data, we looked at whether the category of patentee entity type was corre-
lated with the duration of the case and how the case was disposed. We also explored if
the technology of a given case or the venue or judge was correlated to the patentee
entity type. Our main focus was whether the entity was linked to litigation behavior, the
popular narrative being that PAEs either brought weak cases or engaged in “hit and
run” tactics, and thus their cases were voluntarily disposed of (most likely via settle-
ment), and this disposition happened early. We also sought to determine if the cases
had particular settlement patterns based on entity type.
1. Duration of the Cases
As previously mentioned, we coded for duration by defendant, and not by case. For the
9,101 defendants we coded for from 2010, 8,399 of those defendant’s cases were closed
at the time of coding. Among those remaining, 245 were still open, 347 had been trans-
ferred or consolidated,135 and for 110 of the defendants, termination was impossible to
reliably code. The transferred or consolidated cases were often merged into other cases.
Thus, excluding the transferred or consolidated cases, 96.2 percent of the cases were
closed at the time of coding.
In Figure 1, we report the median and mean of the duration of these closed cases.
These durations are separated by patentee entity type—with Figure 1 separately report-
ing case durations on a defendant basis for lawsuits brought by Individual Inventors
(including family trusts), Operating Companies, Failed Operating Company, Patent
Holding Companies, and Large Aggregators.136 These last two could be considered col-
lectively as PAEs—or non-operating companies. We also collected data for other non-
operating companies such as Universities and Technology Development Companies, but
133Pro se is Latin meaning “on one’s own behalf.” It refers to parties who represent themselves in court without
retaining a lawyer.
134Under the rules of legal ethics, only individuals can appear pro se. Corporations must appear through an
attorney.
135Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), the court may consolidate multiple separately filed lawsuits into a single action.
The multiple lawsuits must involve common issues of fact. Cases can be consolidated for discovery, claim con-
struction, and/or summary judgment, without necessarily consolidating the lawsuits for trial purposes.
136We are aware of only one study investigating duration of lawsuits by entity type. That study uses the broad clas-
sifications of NPE or non-NPE, not the granular categories that we use. See Alex Haus & Steffan Juranek, Patent
Trolls: A Specialization or Hold-Up Story (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id52424407).
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do not report those results here because of the small number of defendants falling
under these three categories.137
Notably, Failed Operating Companies showed the longest mean duration at
almost 700 days, with Individuals having the second longest duration. The difference in
mean duration for such patentees was statistically significant.138 Patent Holding Compa-
nies had a lower mean and median duration than Operating Companies and this differ-
ence was statistically significant.139 The range of median durations was fairly large,
ranging from a low of 251 days for Patent Holding Companies to a high of 397 days for
Individual/Family Trust patentees. We focus here on median durations since they are
not influenced as much by outliers.
While mean and median durations are a useful start, we further analyzed the data
by examining the complete distribution of durations. In Figure 2, we plot the duration
of each defendant by patentee entity type.
Figure 1: Case duration by patentee entity type.
137We follow this convention throughout---reporting the descriptive statistics for patent holding companies, failed
operating companies, and large aggregators to give the reader an insight into the behavior of non-operating com-
panies/PAEs. However, when we perform other statistical analysis, we look at all categories of patentees.
138A t test assuming unequal variance reported a two-tailed p value of 0.0005, with a t statistic of 23.3284 with
451.275 degrees of freedom.
139A t test assuming unequal variance reported a two-tailed p value of 0.0000, with a t statistic of 26.7264 with
3596.84 degrees of freedom. Accord Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation.
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From the histogram, we observe that durations for defendants sued by Operating
Companies and Patent Holding Companies are both right skewed. The Patent Holding
Company distribution is slightly thicker at shorter durations, hinting at a great propen-
sity of Patent Holding Companies to settle earlier in litigation. The Large Aggregator
and Failed Operating Company durations are most evenly spread apart. The Individual
Inventor, especially the individuals who have formed a corporate vehicle to litigate (the
right-bottom box in Figure 2), show a bimodal distribution, with some defendants exit-
ing the case very early and others exiting very late in the litigation.
Next, we used a hazard model to fit the case durations. A hazard model estimates
how various factors affect a known hazard.140 These models, such as the Cox propor-
tional hazard model that we employ, are widely employed in the medical field where
the hazard is patient death.141 Our hazard is termination of the case for a particular
defendant. To better understand the effect of entity types on case duration, we used the
hazard model to estimate how entity type affects the time to termination (i.e., survival
time)—both any type of termination in general and just those terminations that were
settlements.
The first hazard model looked at all defendants that terminated, regardless of the
type of termination (substantive ruling by the court, procedural ruling by the court, or
Figure 2: Histogram of case duration by patentee entity type.
140Stephen J. Walters, What is a Cox Model? Statistics (2009), http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/painres/
download/whatis/cox_model.pdf.
141See, e.g., Spotswood L. Spruance, Julia E. Reid, Michael Grace & Matthew Samore, Hazard Ratio in Clinical
Trials, 48 Antimicrobial Agents & Chemotherapy 2787 (2004).
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voluntary dismissal of the complaint). The survival is quantified in terms of number of
days the case is pending before termination. In Table 1, we report the survival quartiles
for each entity type. The 50 percent column in Table 1 corresponds to the median dura-
tion of defendants, as shown in Figure 1.
Most entity types exhibited a similar distribution among the various quartiles. The
range of durations in the first quartile was the most compact. In the first quartile (25 per-
cent), all the entity types had resolution times between 120 and 241 days. The survival times
spread out across the categories by the third quartile (75 percent), with resolution dates
ranging from 468 days (Patent Holding Companies) to 1,192 days (Failed Operating Com-
panies). Individuals and Failed Operating Companies both appear to pend longer in the
later quartiles. Operating Companies exhibit a similar behavior, but not to the same extent.
To further investigate whether there are any statistically significant differences, we con-
trolled for a variety of independent variables that may also influence the survival time of a
case. These include the total number of defendants in a given case, the technology at issue,
and the district court in which the case is pending. The results of the series of hazard model
regressions are reported in Appendix A1, with the graphical output shown in Figure 3.142
The lines in Figure 3 illustrate the survival rate (the y-axis, between 0 and 1) over
time (the x-axis, measured in years from lawsuit filing). Half the defendants will have
settled at a survival of 0.5. Figure 3 plots the survival curves for Operating Companies
and an aggregate NPE category including all Non-Operating Companies.143 The general
configuration for both entity types is strikingly similar. The NPE curve is lower than the
Operating Company survival curve, showing that defendants sued by NPEs, in general,
obtain quicker resolutions than defendants sued by Operating Companies.
Table 1: Survival in Days for 2010 Patent Lawsuits (Any Disposition)
# of Defs 25% 50% 75% 90%
University 16 241 395 698 820
Individuals 817 206 397 1,043 1,148
Large Aggregator 278 202 362.5 674 827
Failed Operating Company 330 160 347.5 1,192 1,722
Patent Holding Company 1943 120 251 468 804
Operating Company 2899 147 326 693 1,118
Tech. Development Co. 56 231 515 766 1,020
142In unreported hazard models and regressions, we performed the same analyses using uncollapsed defendants.
The trends were identical to those reported in this article. The same variables were statistically significant and
the coefficients were in the same direction.
143In the regressions, we chose a “base” category for entity type. The base category forms the baseline against
which to compare the other categories, both in terms of testing for significance and the magnitude of difference.
We chose to use Operating Companies as the base entity type because we are interested in differences in dura-
tions for various forms of NPEs in comparison to operating companies. In unreported hazard models and regres-
sions, we performed the same analysis using Failed Operating Companies as the base category. The difference
between this base and every other entity type was statistically significant. Because our core hypotheses deal with
the difference between operating companies and various types of NPEs, we felt that operating companies were a
more appropriate base category.
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We also separate NPEs into various categories. In Figure 4, we plot the survival
curves for entity types, separating these categories, and also separating true individual
inventors from individuals litigating in a corporate form.
Patent Holding Companies and Large Aggregators survive at lower rates, both compared
to Operating Companies. That means that Patent Holding Company cases are disposed of
quicker. Defendants sued by Large Aggregators also obtain quicker resolutions. Individual
Inventors who litigated in their personal capacity differed from Individual Inventors who formed
a corporate vehicle before litigating. Individual Inventors who litigated in their personal capacity
survived shorter—their cases were resolved faster. In contrast, Individual Inventors who litigated
in corporate form survived longer than Operating Companies, meaning that their cases were
resolved slower. Failed Operating Companies had their cases resolved slower.144
Figure 3: Hazard model (any disposition).
144These hazard curves could be compared to hazard curves for the duration of other types of civil litigation.
However, the data that were readily available---information from the U.S. Administrative Office of the Courts
(AO)---suffered from two limitations that prevented such a comparison. First, the AO data, while breaking the
cases down by subject matter litigated, do not categorize the data by plaintiff type like our data. This lack of gran-
ularity inhibits a proper comparison between various other civil litigations and patent litigation. Second, the spe-
cific collection methodology and actual validity of the AO data are difficult to ascertain. This makes the ultimate
integrity of a comparison between the AO data and our data questionable. These limitations prevent such a com-
parison in this study. However, one-to-one comparison, once the data are collected and coded for other types of
civil litigation, is a fruitful future avenue of research.
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As reported in Appendix A1, we performed a series of regression models with a
range of control variables.145 The results were completely consistent with the trends
shown in Figure 4 and also consistent across models. The regression results provide
more evidence that our findings are robust. The control variables we include in the
models are consistent with several ex ante views on various factors that may relate to
case duration. One control variable was the total number of defendants in the lawsuit.
Although our unit of analysis is the individual defendant, we recognize that cases may
proceed more slowly the greater the number of defendants in the case. There is more
discovery to take and a greater chance of a disagreement that requires court
intervention.
We controlled for technology because case complexity may be related to technol-
ogy. Technology, especially the chemical/pharmaceutical category, may be an imperfect
proxy for generic drug litigation. Those cases have a complex statutory framework that
includes an automatic 30-month stay upon filing of an application for approval of the
Figure 4: Hazard model (any disposition, separating types of NPEs).
145In the regression models, we only included unrelated defendants. As we previously discussed, we are con-
cerned that some patentees sued multiple related defendants, which may result in some double counts. Remov-
ing related defendants avoids this possibility.
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generic formulation. In these cases, there is little incentive for the patent holder to
quickly press for a ruling on the merits. We controlled for judicial district146 as the dis-
tricts across the country vary in backlog, speed, and the number of patent lawsuits filed
in that district. We also controlled for the number of patents asserted. The thinking
here was that more asserted patents means more work for the parties, which could
mean longer duration. Finally, we controlled for whether the plaintiff was a declaratory
judgment plaintiff as previous empirical work has found this related to duration.147
The regression results confirm that there are some statistically significant differ-
ences in the duration of cases by entity type and district. Notably, Failed Operating
Company cases survived longer than Operating Company cases. Failed Operating Com-
panies had the smallest coefficient in the most complete model. Individual Inventors
who formed a corporate vehicle before litigation also survived longer than Operating
Companies.
Two entity types survived shorter than Operating Company cases: Patent Holding
Companies and Large Aggregators. Patent Holding Companies had the largest coeffi-
cient in the most complete model. The other entity types did not have statistically signif-
icant differences from the base. Cases involving Individual Inventors litigating in their
individual capacity also survived for less time.
The second hazard model focused on a subset of the dispositions, only those cases
that terminated voluntarily. These voluntary terminations are likely settlements, which
may be useful to evaluate litigation strategies of entity types without formal court adjudi-
cation. To truncate the dataset, we excluded defendants that did not settle, but instead
exited the case through a procedural or substantive determination. In Table 2, we
report the survival quartiles for each entity type.
The distribution among entity types is very similar to that observed for all disposi-
tions. Again, Individuals and Failed Operating Companies both appear to pend longer
in the later quartiles. The difference between Operating Companies and other entities
is not as pronounced as seen in Table 1.
Table 2: Survival in Days (Voluntary Dispositions Only)
# of Defs 25% 50% 75% 90%
University 16 241 395 698 820
Individuals 659 192 481 1,067 1,160
Large Aggregator 277 202 363 674 827
Failed Operating Company 286 160 324 1,259 1,722
Patent Holding Company 1844 117 237.5 449 747
Operating Company 2545 142 298 622 1,044
Tech. Development Company 44 220 388 739.5 931
146For our district fixed effects, we included a separate dummy variable for each judicial district in which a patent
case was filed in 2010.
147See Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 67, 95--96 (2015).
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To further investigate whether there are any statistically significant differences, we con-
trolled for the same independent variables listed above. The results of the hazard model
regressions are reported in Appendix A2, with the graphical output shown in Figure 5.
As reported in Appendix A2, our basic results with respect to statistical significance of
Patent Holding Companies and Individual Inventors litigating in corporate form—all relative
to Operating Companies—were consistent across all models, and were the same for volun-
tary dispositions as they were for all dispositions. Failed Operating Companies had longer
durations, but Individual Inventors litigating as individuals had shorter durations.
In addition to the hazard models, we also investigated the relationship between
entity type and case duration using a series of linear regression models. As reported in
Appendix A3, we find similar results in the linear regression models as we do in the haz-
ard models. More specifically, we find that Patent Holding Companies litigate, on aver-
age, between 127 and 197 days less than Operating Companies, while Large Patent
Aggregators litigate on average between 91 and 132 days less than Operating Compa-
nies.148 True Individuals litigate on average between 91 and 195 days fewer than Operat-
ing Companies. Individual Inventors litigating in corporate form litigate on average
between 149 days and 207 days longer than Operating Companies. We note that while
Figure 5: Hazard model (voluntary dispositions only).
148To estimate the number of days, we converted the coefficients from the regressions from years to days.
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these results are statistically significant, that does not mean that these relatively small dif-
ferences are practically important.
In sum, in terms of raw durations, there are differences in durations based on the
patentee entity type. This survivability is statistically significant among many entity types.
2. Disposition of the Cases
Moving beyond case duration, we now discuss case dispositions. Our data also allow us to
observe the disposition of the 8,399 terminated defendants by patentee entity type. As previ-
ously mentioned, we grouped dispositions into three categories: voluntary, procedural, and
substantive dispositions. Figure 6 reports these results for all the coded defendants for six cat-
egories of patentee types: Individuals litigating in their individual capacity, Individuals form-
ing a corporate vehicle to litigate, Operating Companies, Patent Holding Companies, Failed
Operating Companies, and Large Aggregators, after correcting for related defendants.149
As can be seen in Figure 6, the dominant disposition for all patentee entity types is
voluntary, which are highly likely to be settlements. Over 80 percent of all defendants exit
lawsuits because of voluntary settlements. A larger percentage of defendants sued by Large
Aggregators are terminated by settlements compared to other categories of patentees.150
There are, as seen in Figure 6, differences in distribution among the different dispo-
sition categories depending on the patentee entity type. We have, however, concerns that
certain aspects of the raw distribution are endogenous, including where the lawsuits are
filed and the technology. To try to untangle these potential effects, we performed a series
of linear regressions for each disposition—voluntary, procedural, and substantive—with the
entity type.151 In the full specification, we also controlled for the total number of defend-
ants in each case, the number of patents asserted, whether the action was a declaratory
judgment action, technology group fixed effects, district court fixed effects, judge fixed
effects,152 plaintiff attorney fixed effects,153 most litigious patent holder fixed effects,154
149In unreported results, we find essentially the same pattern without collapsing multiple, related defendants into
a single defendant.
150The differences are not statistically significant.
151We separately ran logit, probit, and linear regression models. The results were consistent. For ease of interpre-
tation of the coefficients, we report in this article the results from the linear regression models.
152For judge fixed effects, we included a separate dummy variable for each judge who presided over five or more
defendants in 2010. The remaining judges were included in a residual dummy variable.
153We included a separate fixed effect for each attorney appearing in more than 25 cases, which included 36
lawyers.
154We included a separate fixed effect for each of the most litigious patent holders in 2010. For the most litigious
patent holders, we used any patent holder who sued 50 or more companies in 2010. These were Geotag, Parallel
Networks, Condatis, PACid Group, Uniloc, Adjustacam, ArrivalStar, Gharb, Lexmark, Lottotron, Patent Harbor,
Tripharma, Wolf Run Hollow, and Wordcheck Tech.
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and a pro se representation dummy.155 We ran separate regressions for each disposition,
in part as a robustness test, since the cases that reach each phase may be different. We
clustered standard errors at the district level.156 As reported in full in Appendices B1, B2,
Figure 6: Number of dispositions by patentee entity type (collapsing related defendants).
155For these models, we performed the analysis only on the collapsed defendants. The unreported results for all
defendants showed the same variables as statistically significant and in the same direction.
156As a robustness check, we also reran the regressions with standard errors clustered at the case level. The results
reported in the appendices cluster at the district level, but results from clustering at the case level are materially
the same in terms of statistical significance.
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and B3, there is statistical significance between some entity types.157 For comparison pur-
poses, we used Operating Company as the base category. An F test for joint entity type
effects was statistically significant in all models, further supporting our finding that there
are statistically significant differences among the entity types. The judge fixed effects model
controlled for the identity of the judge. Including judge fixed effects increased the explan-
atory power of some of our models from about 13.5 percent to over 38 percent, a large
increase. The increase in the power of predicting durations when the judge is controlled
for makes sense since the judge has substantial power over the case schedule.
Individual Inventors are statistically significant in many models. Individual Inven-
tors litigating as true individuals are positively correlated with substantive dispositions.158
They are across our models about 88 percent and 213 percent (7–24 percentage points,
with lower percentage points in models with more controls) more likely to result in sub-
stantive dispositions than are Operating Companies. They are negatively correlated with
voluntary dispositions (settlements) by about 13 percent and 29 percent (between 5–25
percentage points, with 25 percentage points in the model with least controls). That
means that Individual Inventors were more likely than Operating Companies, on aver-
age, to have their cases proceed to a resolution by the courts, and less likely to settle.
Fewer settlements and more adjudications is in accord with our findings on Individual
Inventor case duration. Typically, settlements occur quicker than adjudications.
Consistent with the descriptive data presented in Figure 6, Large Aggregators were
much more likely to settle their cases than Operating Companies. They are, depending
on the model, about 7 percent and 18 percent (between 6–16 percentage points, with
16 percentage points in the model with least controls) more likely to settle. Large
Aggregators are between 97 percent and 213 percent (between 6 and 10 percentage
points) less likely to have their cases reach a substantive disposition.
Patent Holding Companies were different in a statistical sense from Operating
Companies on substantive dispositions but not on voluntary dispositions or procedural
dispositions. With respect to settlements (voluntary dispositions), only the least complete
model showed statistically significant differences between Patent Holding Companies
and Operating Companies. Patent Holding Companies were between 56.7 percent and
86.7 percent (between 3 and 5 percentage points) less likely to reach a substantive dis-
position relative to Operating Companies. However, the differences between Patent
Holding Companies and Operating Companies was smaller than the differences
between Individual Inventors and Operating Companies.
Further, Patent Holding Companies and Large Aggregators displayed the opposite
behavior from Individual Inventors. Large Aggregators settled more than Operating
Companies while Individual Inventors settled less. Patent Holding Companies and Large
Aggregators were less likely to adjudicate to a substantive disposition than were
157In the appendices, we report the F statistic for joint entity type effects in all models.
158One individual inventor patentee, Dr. Pieczenik, sued over 40 defendants in 2010. In unreported results, we
excluded the doctor from our regressions and found the same variables statistically significant in the same direc-
tion. Thus, our results are robust regardless of whether he is included in the dataset.
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Operating Companies, while Individual Inventors went to a substantive judgment more
often than Operating Companies.
We pause here to briefly talk about selection concerns. Lawsuits are not randomly
distributed among entity types, technologies, judicial districts, declaratory judgment
actions, numbers of asserted patents, or a whole range of other variables. In fact, these
attributes themselves may be correlated with our variable of interest, patentee entity sta-
tus: PAEs may select patents in certain technologies such as software and file lawsuits in
particular districts such as the Eastern District of Texas. Each of these separately or
together may influence the propensity of a given lawsuit to settle. While we control for
variables such as judicial district, judge, and law firm, our regression models cannot
account for any of these intrinsic characteristics, and our results should be understood
with this important caveat.
B. Relationship Between Patentee Entity Type and Early Settlement and the Merits
We now turn back to the policy-relevant questions of whether PAEs bring mainly frivolous
charges of infringement, seeking nuisance fee settlements. We cannot directly answer these
questions since we do not have any information on the amount of settlements. However,
we can analyze how frequently different types of PAEs quickly settle their cases, perhaps
with an eye to avoiding adjudication of their claims on the merits. In other words, it may
be that cases that settle very early are settling for very small amounts of money, the so-
called hit-and-run phenomenon.159 We analyzed the amount of time it took for various
defendants to have their cases disposed. We divided voluntary dispositions among various
patentee entity types and looked at whether it took less than 60 days, less than 120 days, or
more than 120 days to reach voluntary disposition. We also observed, by patentee entity
type category, the number of defendants that had their cases terminated by the court or
that still had their cases pending. We report the results in Figure 7.
For the patentee entity type cases identified above, a large percentage of defend-
ants were dismissed voluntarily, but after 120 days. In fact, over half the defendants were
dismissed voluntarily after 120 days.
Just as we did with dispositions, we examined whether the difference in distribu-
tion of these times to voluntary dismissal was explainable by various control variables.
We performed similar linear regressions as we did with the dispositions. However, this
time, voluntary dismissal within 60 and within 120 days were the dependent variables
with the wide range of control variables used in the earlier models.
As reported in full in Appendices C1 and C2, when using all the patentee category
types shown in Figure 7, the difference between some entity types and other indepen-
dent variables is statistically significant, and the length of time to voluntary disposition
159We recognize that the opposite may also be true. The early settlements may represent cases in which the par-
ties agree that the patent is valid and infringed, and early settlement reduces both parties’ litigation fees. We are
skeptical that many defendants settle for large sums of money very early in litigation. Patent litigation is quite
unpredictable, in our experience, and defendants are frequently unwilling to settle for significant amounts before
serious litigation.
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when using Operating Companies, mechanical technology, and district courts other
than those identified as the base categories. Of note, Patent Holding Companies are
more likely to settle in every different time period.
Figure 7: Time to disposition by patentee entity type.
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The regression models show statistically significant results for some of the entity
types compared to the base category of Operating Company. Patent Holding Companies
were more likely than Operating Companies to voluntarily settle a case within 60 days
from the date the defendant was sued. Our regression models estimate that the rate of
such an early settlement increases 62 percent and 82 percent (between 4–5 percentage
points) compared to an Operating Company, although the differences are not statisti-
cally significant in our most complete model (which includes lawyer fixed effects) and
at the low end (62 percent) for the next most complete model.
Voluntary dispositions within 120 days tells a different story. Only Patent Holding
Companies are statistically significant in each of our regression models. Thus, there is
robust evidence that in the patent lawsuits filed in 2010, Patent Holding Companies were
more likely to settle early—within 60 or 120 days of suing a defendant—than were Operat-
ing Companies. Individual Inventors are significant, but only in one of our six models.
We also observed the ultimate result in those cases that were not voluntarily dis-
posed. That is, we coded for whether the patentee or alleged infringer received a winning
judgment in those cases with substantive or procedural dispositions. These are a very small
percentage of all filed lawsuits, representing only 640 defendants out of 6,468 defendants
sued (9.89 percent). The outcomes, by patentee entity type, are reported in Table 3.
When just looking at outcomes, the differences between Operating Companies
and PAEs are quite stark. Operating Companies won just under half their cases. PAE
entity types lost more cases than they won. Patent Holding Companies prevailed at adju-
dication on just over 20 percent of defendants. Individual inventors do extremely poorly
in adjudicated cases, winning just 6 percent of those decisions. Unlike our data on case
duration and settlement where Individuals and Patent Holding Companies were on
opposite sides of Operating Companies, both types of PAEs lose much more in adjudica-
tions than do Operating Companies. This is consistent with the narrative that patent
holding companies prosecute weaker cases or have fewer resources to prevail at trial. It
is also generally consistent with findings from another study conducted by one of the
present authors that analyzed lawsuits filed in other years, 2008 and 2009.160
Table 3: Outcomes by Patentee Entity Type
Patentee Wins Alleged Infringer Wins
University 0 0
Individuals 3 (6%) 47 (94%)
Large Aggregator 0 0
Failed Operating Company 8 (40%) 12 (60%)
Patent Holding Company 11 (20.4%) 43 (79.6%)
Operating Company 182 (47.1%) 204 (52.9%)
IP Holding Company 1 (14.3%) 6 (85.7%)
Technology Development Company 0 (0%) 15 (100%)
160Allison et al., supra note 25.
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Intriguingly, Large Aggregators took no cases to a final adjudication. There were no
defendants who either won or lost, meaning that all their cases either settled or resulted in
a procedural disposition. Figure 6 shows that procedural dispositions account for almost
none of the distribution of Large Aggregator cases; Large Aggregators settle with almost
every single defendant. The reasons for and amounts of the settlements, of course, are
unknown to us. It is possible that these entities, with large portfolios of patents, have sizable
bargaining power with defendants. Alternatively, these entities may settle for small cost-of-
defense amounts, making settlement quite enticing to defendants. We note that there were
no intellectual ventures lawsuits filed in 2010, but that Acacia Research Corporation was
very active and its affiliates make up over half our Large Aggregator patent holders. Wi-Lan
was also a frequent Large Aggregator litigant in 2010.
However, the adjudicated defendants represent a very small percentage, about 5
percent, of all the defendants sued. The settlement rates, while all high, differ by entity
type. Unfortunately, we do not know the amount in dispute in these cases nor the settle-
ment amounts. It is possible that the additional cases settled by Patent Holding Compa-
nies, for instance, were lawsuits they would have won if they reached a final ruling. If
this is true (and we have no evidence, either way, on this point), it could explain the dif-
ferences in win rates. Classic law and economics theory argues that the cases that reach
judgment should be the closest cases, the 50–50 cases.161 Our results for Operating
Companies fit this theory, but our results for other patentee types do not. The Priest-
Klein theory of litigation also asserts that when the parties have asymmetric stakes, the
win rate will vary from 50–50. Here, Operating Companies can obtain injunctive relief
in lawsuits while most PAEs cannot.162 Injunctive relief may result in asymmetric
stakes.163 Priest-Klein predict that having more to gain will result in higher trial win
rates,164 which is consistent with what we observe. The long and the short is that
because it is unlikely that the litigated to judgment cases are representative of the set-
tled cases, we urge caution in drawing conclusions from them.
V. Implications
Our analyses of case progression, settlement, and adjudication, taken together, reveal a
complicated settlement picture of litigation by different entity types. Some of this may
be expected. For instance, cases where an Operating Company is the patentee plaintiff
161Priest & Klein, supra note 36. Others have criticized parts of the Priest-Klein theory. See, e.g., Lee & Klerman,
supra note 36.
162Seaman, supra note 50 at 1988, Fig. 3 (2016).
163Id. at 1980 (“The selection effect is compounded by the asymmetric stakes of injunctive relief, which typically
‘harms the infringer more than it benefits the patentee.’ These factors may result in underrepresentation of cer-
tain types of patent cases. For instance, injunction decisions involving PAEs appear to be underrepresented in
the Decisions Dataset.”).
164Priest & Klein, supra note 161.
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may be more likely to have patent counterclaims, which increase the complexity and
length of the litigation. Perhaps most interesting and counterintuitive is that the data
suggest that not all PAEs are equal. When compared to Operating Companies, some
PAE cases exhibit higher survivability—Individuals—and others lower survivability—Pat-
ent Holding Companies and Large Aggregators. Thus, different types of PAEs are on
opposite sides of Operating Companies in terms of how long their cases last.
Individual Inventors are much less likely to settle overall. Large Aggregators are
much more likely to settle overall, but there is no evidence that Large Aggregators settle
early. Patent Holding Companies settle early and later. It may be that these early settle-
ments represent nuisance value settlements. However, we offer two observations. First,
while the common cost estimates of patent litigation are that it costs millions of dollars
in attorney fees, cases that settle within a few months cost only a fraction of that
amount. Second, the fact that we only observe early settlements for Individuals, but not
for the later ones may relate to the selection of disputes for litigation. Although compet-
itors may resolve some disputes before commencing formal litigation, non-competitors
may not have that opportunity. It may be that the only way that large defendants, or at
least their lawyers and corporate decisionmakers, will take a license from companies
with whom they are not familiar is if the matter progresses to litigation.
Perhaps Large Aggregators want to settle, but seek larger sums. Perhaps they are
well schooled in finding the optimal point to settle lawsuits, as repeat players in the
business, and do not settle too early. Rather, they wait until they receive information
during discovery or wait for important court rulings. Then they settle before trial to
avoid uncertainty. Hence, we need to carefully consider various policy recommendations
to make sure they will have the intended effect. For instance, because Large Aggregators
are more likely to settle than other types of patentees, fee shifting upon an unsuccessful
lawsuit will have less bite.
Individual inventors who have formed a corporate vehicle to enforce tend to liti-
gate for a substantial duration. These individual inventors may be more sophisticated
than the individual inventors who litigate without forming a corporate entity. They may
be guided by more sophisticated counsel, which results in more strategic litigation. For
instance, these patent holders may embark on a “war chest” model of litigation.165 True
individual inventors may be making small technical contributions to the field. Thus,
they may be entitled to small compensation. Furthermore, as for trial win rates, perhaps
this is explained by resources at trial. Large corporate defendants and plaintiffs have the
financial resources to pay well-credentialed experts and prepare polished graphical pre-
sentations. One expects that this matters in terms of jury perception and outcomes.
Individual Inventors settle less frequently, and reach merits rulings more often,
but have a shorter duration. At first glance, the shorter duration and more substantive
rulings seem in direct conflict. However, many of the Individual Inventor lawsuits were
165David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 335, 368--
69 (2012) (describing the “war chest” model of enforcing a patent against multiple alleged infringers, which
entails using settlement money from early defendants to build a “war chest” to pay experts and lawyers in subse-
quent cases. This permits the later cases to be litigated more aggressively).
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resolved quickly, some even by motions to dismiss. Thus, even when the court resolved
the case, it often occurred quickly (frequently finding against the Individual Inventor
on the merits).
It is possible that true individual patent holders may be less sophisticated and
reject reasonable settlement offers. Alternatively, perhaps there are differences in their
litigation counsel, the underlying patents, or some other characteristic of the litigation
system that may explain these results.
Why are true individuals different from individuals who chose to incorporate
before litigating? It may be that true individuals lack sophistication if they bring a law-
suit without forming a corporate entity. As a litigant, they are subject to potential fee
shifting as well as responsibility for litigation costs if they fail on the merits. If the indi-
vidual incorporates, then the corporate entity will be liable for any award, not the indi-
vidual. Thus, lack of incorporation may signal less sophistication. Alternatively, patents
owned by an individual may be purchased by a Large Aggregator or Patent Holding
Company. If these entities decline to purchase a patent from an individual, the individ-
ual may assert it herself in litigation. We would expect these patents to be weaker, how-
ever, since PAEs declined to purchase and enforce them.
VI. Conclusion
The actual litigation behavior of PAEs is much more complicated than the simple narra-
tives portrayed in the media. Within the broad category of PAEs, there is tremendous
heterogeneity. Entity types, particularly individual inventors and patent holding compa-
nies, behave differently than operating companies. However, individual inventors litigate
longer, while patent holding companies litigate more quickly. The differences in litiga-
tion behavior, while contrary to the common narrative, are not altogether unexpected.
The differences are indeed consistent with economic intuition. Different entity types
likely have different risk profiles and different incentives, for instance, which drive settle-
ment and litigation strategy. Our robust empirical study confirms that not all PAEs are
alike.
Cries that PAEs are universally different from other types of patentee plaintiffs
appear to be overstated with respect to case progression and settlement. Using granular
data on a per-defendant basis, we analyzed the relationship between entity type in settle-
ment behavior and litigation outcomes. The relationship is more complex than previ-
ously understood. Individual inventors play a larger role in the patent system than
others have recognized, as do failed operating companies. Surprisingly, individual inven-
tors and failed operating companies appear to be quite different from operating compa-
nies and even from other PAEs. Their cases pend longer, indicating that they litigate
more, and they settle at lower rates. Why individual inventors and failed operating com-
panies may be behaving differently is an important question, and one that we cannot
fully answer with our data. That said, our analysis indicates that some of the “hit-and-
run” complaints about patent trolls do not seem to apply to individual inventors or
failed operating companies.
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Turning to PAEs, we examine whether they settle cases more quickly compared to
operating companies. We find that certain venues, technologies, and types of PAEs are
correlated with early settlement, but other types of PAEs exhibited the opposite behav-
ior. We cannot, unfortunately, analyze the amount of money included in settlement
agreements, as that information is not publicly available and typically treated as confi-
dential. Thus, we cannot directly confront the story that PAEs seek nuisance fee settle-
ments, especially in ways that are meaningfully different from operating company patent
holders. The duration data indirectly contradict this story, but further study is recom-
mended. Finally, further study of the underlying patents in the disputes, including the
origination of patents asserted by PAEs, will be useful.
Our study establishes that there is significant heterogeneity in litigation behavior
and in litigation outcomes among various types of patent plaintiffs. As a result, any pat-
ent policy reform that targets specific patent plaintiff types or categories of patent plain-
tiffs (such as practicing entity vs. non-practicing entity) should be analyzed carefully to
understand the disparate impacts that the proposed legislation might have on different
categories of patent plaintiffs, for the proposed reform might well fail to meet its
intended objectives.
Appendix
Appendix A1: Hazard Model Regression (All Dispositions)a
Duration (Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University 0.065
(0.149)
0.041
(0.186)
20.036
(0.194)
0.132
(0.330)
0.161
(0.338)
Large Aggregator 0.303***
(0.108)
0.308***
(0.117)
0.337***
(0.123)
0.384***
(0.129)
0.599***
(0.165)
Failed Operating Co. 20.232
(0.198)
20.484**
(0.204)
20.420**
(0.205)
20.767***
(0.260)
0.199
(0.220)
Patent Holding Co. 0.436***
(0.076)
0.475***
(0.081)
0.507***
(0.087)
0.554***
(0.100)
0.543***
(0.108)
Technology Development Co. 20.101
(0.159)
20.048
(0.157)
20.019
(0.165)
0.069
(0.252)
0.121
(0.215)
Individual 0.503***
(0.090)
0.371***
(0.110)
0.349***
(0.119)
0.398**
(0.172)
0.363**
(0.178)
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form 20.221**
(0.112)
20.371***
(0.118)
20.311***
(0.120)
20.379**
(0.176)
0.002
(0.160)
Pro se Plaintiff 1.567**
(0.764)
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FI^I No No No No Yes
Court FE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix A2: Hazards Regression (Voluntary Dispositions Only)a
Duration (Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University 20.030
(0.161)
20.108
(0.191)
20.174
(0.189)
20.268
(0.407)
20.264
(0.447)
Large Aggregator 0.226**
(0.113)
0.258**
(0.124)
0.274**
(0.132)
0.275**
(0.139)
0.349**
(0.174)
Failed Operating Co. 20.246
(0.230)
20.480**
(0.238)
20.417*
(0.239)
20.853***
(0.308)
0.477**
(0.227)
Patent Holding Co. 0.440***
(0.078)
0.495***
(0.087)
0.523***
(0.092)
0.527***
(0.106)
0.438”*
(0.117)
Technology Development Co. 20.137
(0.201)
0.004
(0.204)
0.043
(0.213)
0.033
(0.263)
0.159
(0.252)
Individual 0.354***
(0.113)
0.163
(0.137)
0.142
(0.145)
0.112
(0.169)
0.060
(0.164)
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form 20.244**
(0.121)
20.373***
(0.130)
20.320**
(0.133)
20.368*
(0.203)
0.182
(0.178)
Pro se Plaintiff 2.159***
(0.557)
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FE No No No No Yes
Court EE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec. Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 5,456 5,456 5,452 5,452 5,452
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
aThe table in Appendix A2 reports five separate Cox hazard models that predict the hazard of voluntary case dis-
position for each defendant. The omitted patentee type is operating company. The various controls are attorney
fixed effects (Attorney FE), fixed effects for the most litigious patentees in 2010 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects
(Court FE), judge fixed effects (Judge FE), declaratory judgment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No.
Def.), NBER technology category (Technology), and the number of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs”
provides the number of observations present in the model. The models were created using Stata.
Appendix A1 Continued
Duration (Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,127 6,127 6,105 6,105 6,105
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0., ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
aThe table in Appendix A1 reports five separate Cox hazard models that predict the hazard of case disposition
for each defendant. The omitted patentee type is operating company. The various controls are attorney fixed
effects (Attorney FE), fixed effects for the most litigious patentees in 2010 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects
(Court FE), judge fixed effects (Judge FE), declaratory judgment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No.
Def.), NBER technology category (Technology), and the number of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs”
provides the number of observations present in the model. The models were created using Stata.
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Appendix A3: Linear Regression on Durationa
Duration (Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University –0.027
(0.153)
–0.053
(0.220)
–0.005
(0.244)
–0.257
(0.270)
–0.247
(0.304)
Large Aggregator –0.354***
(0.117)
–0.327***
(0.114)
–0.342**
(0.137)
–0.248**
(0.110)
–0.363***
(0.135)
Failed Operating Co. 0.243
(0.432)
0.572*
(0.290)
0.521*
(0.309)
0.674**
(0.262)
–0.077
(0.218)
Patent Holding Co. –0.522***
(0.061)
–0.506***
(0.063)
–0.539***
(0.079)
–0.419***
(0.107)
–0.347***
(0.085)
Technology Development Co. 0.131
(0.195)
0.065
(0.182)
0.025
(0.201)
0.011
(0.293)
0.003
(0.203)
Individual –0.534***
(0.101)
–0.393***
(0.103)
–0.397***
(0.111)
–0.337**
(0.155)
–0.249**
(0.113)
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form 0.408
(0.253)
0.550**
(0.233)
0.504**
(0.241)
0.566**
(0.227)
0.055
(0.152)
Pro se Plaintiff –0.725***
(0.278)
F statistic 15.49*** 21.71*** 40.58*** 55.67*** 3.01***
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FE No No No No Yes
Court FE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec. Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,127 6,127 6,105 6,105 6,105
R2 0.116 0.183 0.186 0.384 0.430
Dep Var Mean 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.1; **p< 0.0; ***p< 0.01.
aThe table in Appendix A3 reports five linear regression models that predict the duration a particular defendant
remains in a lawsuit. The omitted patentee type is Operating Company. Standard errors were clustered at the dis-
trict court level. The various controls are attorney fixed effects (Attorney FE), fixed effects for the most litigious
patentees in 2010 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects (Court FE), judge fixed effects (Judge FE), declaratory judg-
ment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No. Def.), NBER technology category (Technology), and the num-
ber of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs” provides the number of observations present in the model. “F
statistic” reports the results of an F test for joint entity type effects. The models were created using Stata.
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Appendix B1: Voluntary Dispositionsa
Voluntary Dispositions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University 0.112*
(0.059)
0.163**
(0.072)
0.158**
(0.069)
0.157
(0.114)
0.154
(0.119)
Large Aggregator 0.158***
(0.035)
0.100***
(0.035)
0.094**
(0.041)
0.057***
(0.017)
0.132***
(0.043)
Failed Operating Co. 0.035
(0.056)
0.002
(0.063)
0.014
(0.071)
–0.063*
(0.038)
–0.024
(0.055)
Patent Holding Co. 0.067**
(0.033)
0.036
(0.029)
0.041
(0.033)
0.010
(0.026)
0.041*
(0.025)
Technology Development Co. –0.062
(0.079)
–0.044
(0.081)
–0.033
(0.083)
0.084
(0.059)
0.017
(0.068)
Individual –0.249**
(0.105)
–0.193*
(0.104)
–0.171
(0.104)
–0.114
(0.078)
–0.053
(0.043)
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form 0.138**
(0.069)
0.102
(0.069)
0.108
(0.068)
0.080***
(0.029)
–0.073
(0.102)
Pro se Plaintiff –0.118
(0.103)
F statistic 25.38*** 6.4*** 5.27*** 32.4*** 2.12**
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FE No No No No Yes
Court FE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec. Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,343 6,343 6,321 6,321 6,321
R2 0.054 0.143 0.135 0.382 0.426
Dep Var Mean 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
aThe table in Appendix B1 reports five linear regression models that predict that a particular defendant exited
the lawsuit because of a voluntary disposition. The omitted patentee type is Operating Company. Standard errors
were clustered at the district court level. The various controls are attorney fixed effects (Attorney FE), fixed
effects for the most litigious patentees in 2010 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects (Court FE), judge fixed effects
(Judge FE), declaratory judgment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No. Def.), NBER technology category
(Technology), and the number of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs” provides the number of observa-
tions present in the model. “F statistic” reports the results of an F test for joint entity type effects. The models
were created using Stata.
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Appendix B2: Substantive Dispositionsa
Substantive Dispositions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University –0.082***
(0.015)
–0.061***
(0.021)
–0.053**
(0.026)
–0.128***
(0.034)
–0.124**
(0.051)
Large Aggregator –0.075***
(0.014)
–0.073***
(0.017)
–0.070***
(0.023)
–0.058***
(0.018)
–0.102***
(0.029)
Failed Operating Co. –0.008
(0.020)
0.008
(0.022)
–0.005
(0.024)
0.004
(0.024)
0.070
(0.056)
Patent Holding Co. –0.049***
(0.013)
–0.047***
(0.012)
–0.052***
(0.017)
–0.034*
(0.019)
–0.044**
(0.020)
Technology Development Co. 0.091
(0.088)
0.081
(0.093)
0.072
(0.094)
0.041
(0.080)
0.036
(0.059)
Individual 0.225*
(0.117)
0.237*
(0.124)
0.204
(0.125)
0.122
(0.087)
0.065*
(0.034)
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form –0.063***
(0.022)
–0.047**
(0.020)
–0.056**
(0.024)
–0.071**
(0.031)
–0.017
(0.032)
Pro se Plaintiff 0.151
(0.125)
F statistic 32.82*** 22.5*** 22.1*** 24.23*** 3.43***
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FE No No No No Yes
Court FE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec. Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,343 6,343 6,321 6,321 6,321
R2 0.073 0.127 0.108 0.337 0.380
Dep Var Mean 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
aThe table in Appendix B2 reports five linear regression models that predict that a particular defendant exited
the lawsuit because of a substantive disposition. The omitted patentee type is Operating Company. Standard
errors were clustered at the district court level. The various controls are attorney fixed effects (Attorney FE),
fixed effects for the most litigious patentees in 2010 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects (Court FE), judge fixed
effects (Judge FE), declaratory judgment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No. Def.), NBER technology cate-
gory (Technology), and the number of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs” provides the number of obser-
vations present in the model. “F statistic” reports the results of an F test for joint entity type effects. The models
were created using Stata.
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Appendix B3: Procedural Dispositionsa
Procedural Dispositions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University –0.054***
(0.009)
–0.072**
(0.031)
–0.073**
(0.033)
–0.076**
(0.036)
–0.072
(0.057)
Large Aggregator –0.034**
(0.014)
–0.015
(0.014)
–0.024
(0.017)
–0.021*
(0.013)
–0.038**
(0.019)
Failed Operating Co. 0.047*
(0.026)
0.052*
(0.029)
0.053*
(0.031)
0.074***
(0.025)
–0.038
(0.026)
Patent Holding Co. –0.004
(0.015)
0.004
(0.019)
–0.002
(0.019)
0.002
(0.016)
–0.007
(0.017)
Technology Development Co. 0.003
(0.029)
0.003
(0.032)
0.008
(0.035)
–0.029
(0.054)
–0.028
(0.036)
Individual 0.065
(0.067)
0.009
(0.031)
0.010
(0.030)
0.025
(0.022)
0.026
(0.028)
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form 0.001
(0.022)
0.010
(0.023)
0.007
(0.030)
0.025
(0.021)
0.117
(0.106)
Pro se Plaintiff –0.039
(0.038)
F statistic 11.2*** 8.21*** 10.57*** 25.46*** 1.17
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FE No No No No Yes
Court FE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec. Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,343 6,343 6,321 6,321 6,321
R2 0.016 0.103 0.112 0.364 0.386
Dep Var Mean 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.0.
aThe table in Appendix B3 reports five linear regression models that predict that a particular defendant exited
the lawsuit because of a procedural disposition. The omitted patentee type is Operating Company. Standard
errors were clustered at the district court level. The various controls are attorney fixed effects (Attorney FE),
fixed effects for the most litigious patentees in 200 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects (Court FE), judge fixed
effects (Judge FE), declaratory judgment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No. Def.), NBER technology cate-
gory (Technology), and the number of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs” provides the number of obser-
vations present in the model. “F statistic” reports the results of an F test for joint entity type effects. The models
were created using Stata.
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Appendix C1: Voluntary Dispositions 60 Days or Lessa
Voluntary Dispositions 60 Days or Less
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University –0.018
(0.067)
–0.031
(0.063)
–0.036
(0.066)
0.015
(0.073)
0.018
(0.059)
Large Aggregator 0.003
(0.024)
0.008
(0.025)
0.013
(0.026)
0.004
(0.015)
–0.011
(0.029)
Failed Operating Co. 0.053
(0.055)
0.045
(0.049)
0.044
(0.051)
0.017
(0.029)
0.005
(0.032)
Patent Holding Co. 0.046***
(0.017)
0.049***
(0.018)
0.048***
(0.018)
0.037*
(0.020)
0.022
(0.021)
Technology Development Co. –0.010
(0.024)
–0.005
(0.020)
–0.003
(0.026)
–0.010
(0.055)
–0.002
(0.045)
Individual –0.012
(0.018)
–0.013
(0.020)
–0.015
(0.022)
0.001
(0.016)
0.003
(0.023)
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form 0.016
(0.018)
0.019
(0.021)
0.019
(0.022)
0.017
(0.032)
0.031
(0.049)
Pro se Plaintiff 0.010
(0.070)
F statistic 2.06* 2.68** 2.32** 1.6 0.63
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FE No No No No Yes
Court FE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec. Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,343 6,343 6,321 6,321 6,321
R2 0.021 0.049 0.052 0.234 0.243
Dep Var Mean 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
aThe table in Appendix C reports five linear regression models that predict that a particular defendant exited
the lawsuit within 60 days because of a voluntary disposition. The omitted patentee type is Operating Company.
Standard errors were clustered at the district court level. The various controls are attorney fixed effects (Attorney
FE), fixed effects for the most litigious patentees in 2010 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects (Court FE), judge
fixed effects (Judge FE), declaratory judgment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No. Def.), NBER technol-
ogy category (Technology), and the number of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs” provides the number
of observations present in the model. “F statistic” reports the results of an F test for joint entity type effects. The
models were created using Stata.
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Appendix C2: Voluntary Dispositions 120 Days or Lessa
Voluntary Dispositions 120 Days or Less
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University –0.087
(0.087)
–0.096
(0.075)
–0.128
(0.092)
–0.098*
(0.051)
–0.104
(0.065)
Large Aggregator –0.018
(0.038)
–0.020
(0.039)
–0.008
(0.042)
–0.044
(0.034)
–0.053
(0.048)
Failed Operating Co. 0.056
(0.064)
0.044
(0.057)
0.061
(0.057)
0.014
(0.032)
0.009
(0.044)
Patent Holding Co. 0.111***
(0.025)
0.112***
(0.029)
0.119***
(0.030)
0.077**
(0.031)
0.054*
(0.031)
Technology Development Co. –0.104**
(0.043)
–0.092**
(0.044)
–0.077
(0.053)
–0.061
(0.076)
–0.041
(0.061)
Individual –0.040
(0.027)
–0.052*
(0.028)
–0.040
(0.031)
–0.048
(0.044)
–0.059
(0.042)
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form 0.060
(0.042)
0.050
(0.045)
0.065
(0.040)
0.066
(0.047)
0.103
(0.068)
Pro se Plaintiff 0.040
(0.063)
F statistic 11.07*** 12.93*** 12.01*** 22.41*** 2.26**
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FE No No No No Yes
Court FE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec. Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,343 6,343 6,321 6,321 6,321
R2 0.034 0.075 0.082 0.257 0.276
Dep Var Mean 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.; **p< 0.0; ***p< 0.01.
aThe table in Appendix C2 reports five linear regression models that predict that a particular defendant exited
the lawsuit within 120 days because of a voluntary disposition. The omitted patentee type is Operating Company.
Standard errors were clustered at the district court level. The various controls are attorney fixed effects (Attorney
FE), fixed effects for the most litigious patentees in 2010 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects (Court FE), judge
fixed effects (Judge FE), declaratory judgment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No. Def.), NBER technol-
ogy category (Technology), and the number of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs” provides the number
of observations present in the model. “F statistic” reports the results of an F test for joint entity type effects. The
models were created using Stata.
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Appendix C3: Dispositions 121 Days or Morea
Dispositions 121 Days or More
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
University 0.096
–0.087
0.098
–0.077
0.131
–0.094
0.089*
–0.052
0.097
–0.066
Large Aggregator 0.024
–0.038
0.021
–0.038
0.005
–0.04
0.044
–0.031
0.058
–0.048
Failed Operating Co. –0.052
–0.063
–0.045
–0.056
–0.061
–0.055
–0.014
–0.029
–0.009
–0.045
Patent Holding Co. –0.107***
–0.025
–0.110***
–0.028
–0.117***
–0.027
–0.076***
–0.027
–0.052*
–0.031
Technology Development Co. 0.112**
–0.043
0.098**
–0.043
0.085
–0.053
0.063
–0.073
0.05
–0.06
Individual –0.031
–0.064
–0.016
–0.078
–0.035
–0.082
–0.012
–0.079
0.009
–0.053
Ind. Lit. in Corp. Form –0.056
–0.041
–0.051
–0.046
–0.066*
–0.04
–0.065
–0.046
–0.105
–0.068
Pro se Plaintiff –0.27
–0.208
F statistic 10.22*** 13.42*** 12.32*** 18.63*** 1.86**
Controls
Attorney FE No No No No Yes
Litigious FE No No No No Yes
Court FE No Yes Yes No No
Judge FE No No No Yes Yes
Dec. Judge. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Def. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology No No Yes Yes Yes
No. Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6343 6343 6321 6321 6321
R2 0.033 0.074 0.082 0.265 0.284
Dep Var Mean 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
aThe table in Appendix C3 reports five linear regression models that predict that a particular defendant exited
the lawsuit after 120 days. The omitted patentee type is Operating Company. Standard errors were clustered at
the district court level. The various controls are attorney fixed effects (Attorney FE), fixed effects for the most liti-
gious patentees in 2010 (Litigious FE), court fixed effects (Court FE), judge fixed effects (Judge FE), declaratory
judgment (Dec. Judge.), number of defendants (No. Def.), NBER technology category (Technology), and the
number of patents in the lawsuit (No. Patents). “Obs” provides the number of observations present in the model.
“F statistic” reports the results of an F test for joint entity type effects. The models were created using Stata.
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